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Stretching, Embeddedness, and Scripts in a Sociotechnical Transition: Explaining the Failure of 
Electric Mobility at Better Place (2007-2013) 
 
Abstract: Based on field research, interviews, and participant observation, this study explores the failure 
of Better Place—a now bankrupt company—to successfully demonstrate and deploy battery swapping 
stations and electric vehicle charging infrastructure. To do so, it draws from concepts in innovation 
studies, sociotechnical transitions, management science, organizational studies, and sociology. The study 
expands upon the notion of “fit-stretch”, which explains how innovations can move from an initial “fit” 
(with existing user practices, discourses, technical form) to a subsequent “stretch” (as the technology 
further develops, new functionalities are opened up, etc.) in the process of long-term transitions. It also 
draws from the “dialectical issue life cycle model” or “triple embeddedness framework” to explain the 
process whereby incumbent industry actors can introduce defensive innovations to “contain” a new niche 
from expanding.  It lastly incorporates elements from design-driven innovation and organizational 
learning related to schemas and scripts, concepts that illustrate the vision-dependent and discursive 
elements of the innovation process.  It uses the case study of Better Place to test and build upon these 
concepts.  With a market valuation of more than $2 billion, Better Place was poised to become one of 
the most innovative companies in the electric mobility market.  Yet after operating for five years it 
declared bankruptcy and saw its assets sold off for less than $500,000.  We suggest here that Better Place 
failed because it “stretched” to the point that it “broke;” that it provoked a defensive response from both 
old automotive manufacturers (such as General Motors) and new ones (such as Tesla); and that the 
fantastic nature of its visionary scripts convinced its investors and promoters to unrealistically raise 
expectations and downplay persistent risks.  
 
1. Introduction  
Project Better Place, later renamed “Better Place,” was a venture-capital backed international 
company that developed battery charging and switching infrastructures for electric vehicles and sold 
electric mobility services to drivers. While founded in 2007 and headquartered in California, it operated 
primarily in Denmark and Israel, where it saw the opening of its first charging station in 2008 (Noel and 
Sovacool 2016).  At the height of its success, it was considering expansions to a half-dozen other 
countries and had a market valuation that peaked at approximately $2.25 billion (Orsato et al. 2009) 
undergirded with investments from General Electric, Hong Kong Shanghai Bank of China (HSBC), and 
Morgan Stanley, in addition to endorsements from prominent public figures.  It also saw the launching 
of its first prototype vehicle (manufactured jointly with Renault) on the market in 2012.  A mere year 
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later, in May 2013, the company filed for bankruptcy and saw its assets seized and sold off for 
$450,000—the price of a single apartment in Tel Aviv (Kloosterman 2013). 
Why did Better Place fail after securing funding, partners, and operating in two “green” countries 
with a novel idea?  For business experts, the reasons stipulated for the failure are straightforward. They 
contend that Better Place’s financial difficulties were caused by technological inferiority—electric 
vehicles with limited range and battery designs not yet ready for extensive commercial deployment. Such 
technical difficulties were only exacerbated by mismanagement on behalf of its entrepreneurial but 
somewhat erratic founder Shai Agassi; wasteful efforts to introduce pilot projects in too many countries; 
and large amounts of investment sunk into charging and battery swapping infrastructure (see Woody 
2013; Kershne 2013; Niv 2013; Naor et al. 2015; Noel and Sovacool 2016).. On the other hand, some 
academics even praised Better Place for its presumed innovativeness and likely future success (e.g. 
Christensen et al. 2012; Kley et al. 2011; Andersen et al. 2009). Overall, both practice-oriented and 
academic explanations are not sufficiently anchored on research. 
In addressing this research gap, in this paper we use insights from innovation and management 
theory related to sociotechnical transitions, embeddedness, and schemas and scripts.  By doing so, we 
not only provide a grounded account of an event that is too common in the car industry, but one that also 
provide insights for future for those seeking to change the technological regime of the automotive 
industry.  Drawing from extensive original data collection derived from field research, we contend that 
Better Placed failed because it attempted to “stretch” too quickly from its initial “fit” with existing user 
practices and conventions surrounding user mobility.  We also argue that rather than existing in a vacuum, 
Better Place promoted a strategic response from competing industry stakeholders.  Some of these 
incumbents, such as General Motors, responded by promoting their own battery electric vehicles and 
swapping stations in tandem with others, such as Tesla, explored their own type of swappable batteries.  
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Lastly, we maintain that Better Place subscribed to a vision-dependent corporate mission and strategy 
that ended up relying on unrealistic discursive scripts that overestimated benefits and underestimated 
costs.   
In proceeding along these lines, the study sets out to make three contributions. First, examining 
the sociotechnical challenges facing Better Place brings to light pressing policy and economic questions 
about the viability of emerging business models for electric mobility.  For all intents and purposes, Better 
Place should have worked or at least could have worked. It was backed by strong investors and solicited 
significant consumer and policy interest.  The fact that it failed, somewhat spectacularly, serves as a stark 
warning for those seeking to promote more socially acceptable, politically attainable, economically 
justifiable markets for low-carbon transport modalities.  Second, Better Place provoked a response from 
incumbents, and therefore better comprehending its struggles generate insights into patterns of obduracy, 
incumbency, and socio-technical lock-in that can stymie the adoption of socially beneficial niche 
innovations.  Third, by synthesizing from three separate conceptual domains, the paper underscores the 
necessity of taking a ‘theoretically eclectic’ approach to the study of sociotechnical change (Sovacool 
and Hess 2017), in this instance the significance of techno-economic factors (such as automobiles, 
batteries, and tariffs as well as industrial strategy)) alongside socio-political-cognitive factors (such as 
user perceptions of radicalism vs. incrementalism, cultural embeddedness, and rhetorical visions). 
2. Research methods and concepts 
 Our data for this study was original qualitative research drawn from a mix of research interviews 
and longitudinal participant observation. Our primary data tool was semi-structured interviews.  This 
means our data collection involved the asking of semi-structured questions to respondents, sometimes 
referred to as “guided introspection,” “intensive interviewing” or “responsive interviewing” (Hancke 
2009).  This technique asks participants a set of standard inquiries but then allows the conversation to 
 4 
build and deviate to explore new areas.   Such interviews are most appropriate when the goal of research 
is to understand the meaning that individuals give to their actions, particularly when the research 
objective is to comprehend complicated programs or events and how they intersect with perceptions, 
beliefs, and values (Drumwright and Murphy 2004; Yin 2003).  We decided on an elite sampling strategy, 
meaning we targeted participants with control over the case in question, as opposed to laypersons, 
consumers, or voters (Lincoln and Guba 1985; Dexter 1970).  Elite interviews are most useful when 
intended to reveal the motivations and actions behind decision-making, as it can depict how respondents 
perceive reality from the viewpoint of someone on the “inside.”   
Forty-three interviews were completed with Better Place (BP) employees as well as competing 
automotive companies, some suppliers and some manufacturers over the course of 2008 to 2016.  Context 
interviews were carried out initially; these included interviews with elites/experts in the automotive 
industry. Collection of company-level data at BP took place in stages. Pilot interviews at Better Place 
took place in 2008 and 2009 (including one with the founder and promoter, Shai Agassi) followed by 
interviews with top managers and technicians of BP in 2009 and 2010 across several parts of the world 
(Denmark, Israel, Japan, and the United States).  These were followed by a final set of interviews in 2015 
and 2016 with automotive experts and former staff at BP.      
A few other specifics of this research process deserve mentioning.  Interviews lasted between 40 
and 90 minutes; some of the context interviews lasted up to two hours. The interviews were transcribed 
and a complete database was created. Given that the problem of access is a typical characteristic of 
empirical research in the industry (Bulmer 1988), the authors utilized a “snowball strategy” to contact 
development (Robson 1993). One of the authors first interviewed the experts familiar to them or 
colleagues before having them suggest others to meet, branching out to other companies and 
organizations.  The chosen interviewing strategy thus had a strong focus on information provided by the 
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respondent combined with a weak emphasis on process of interviewing. In other words, “what” was more 
important for the applied interviewing strategy, than “how” or “who.”  This differs from “creative” or 
“active” interviewing, which is based on the idea that the process of interviewing is at least as important 
as the information provided by the respondent (Holstein and Gubrium 2002). While active interviewing 
is indispensable for studying topics that touch upon the deep personal experiences of respondents, it was 
not applicable in the present study on BP management and work-related functions.  Interviews were 
supplemented with company documents, direct observation, and site visits shown in Table 1.  In the 
sections of the paper to come, we inductively and qualitatively build the storyline from both a mix of the 
interviews and literature, in order to enhance its coherence and narrative flow.  
Table 1: Overview of Primary Research Methods Utilized in this Study 
Type of data Source(s) Number (n) Details (when applicable) 
Context 
interviews 
Experts in electric mobility  4 
interviews 
3 senior faculty at universities; 
1 at a research institute  
 Experts in the automotive industry 6 
interviews 
4 senior faculty at universities; 
2 at research institutes  
Company 
interviews 
Pilot interviews at Better Place  9  
interviews 
- (confidential) 
 Management interviews at Better 
Place  
14 
interviews 
- (confidential) 
 Interviews at other companies  10 
interviews 
3 at Tesla, 4 at Volkswagen, 3 
at General Motors Group  
Other types of 
sources 
   
Company 
documents 
Internal documents  30 documents, reports, 
memos, white papers 
 Annual reports  4 documents 
Direct 
observation  
Guided tours of Better Place 
facilities  
 12 hours 
 Attendance of seminars for 
representatives of Better Place 
 40 hours 
 Attendance of three automotive fairs 
(Germany, Japan, United States) 
 12 hours 
Source: Authors’ compilation.  
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The data from these interviews is presented as anonymous—as coming from a “participant” or 
“interviewee” without attribution—for multiple reasons.  First, we are unable to offer more details or 
profiles of respondents because of confidentiality concerns.  Confidentiality was mutually agreed upon 
at the beginning of each interview to adhere to the ethics guidelines at the authors’ institutions.  Second, 
anonymity protects respondents from retaliation over divulging potentially controversial information, 
especially when the topic is as polemic as a company that went bankrupt. Moreover, anonymity 
encourages candor, as people often speak their minds if they no longer have to worry about their 
statements coming back to haunt them.  Lastly, individuals were not speaking on behalf of their 
institutions and were instead giving their personal opinion, making institutional affiliation less relevant 
(though still important for sampling purposes).    
To ensure triangulation, we supplemented our original data with a review of the peer-reviewed 
literature on both electric mobility generally and more specifically the contours and operations of Better 
Place.  We searched key academic databases such as Scopus, ScienceDirect, and EBSCO-Host for 
articles published in the last ten years (2006-2015) looking at (a) the social acceptance of electric 
vehicles, (b) business models for electric mobility, and (c) case studies of Better Place (of which there 
were only a handful).  We compiled dozens of studies though we reference only the most relevant ones 
here. 
 To filter this capacious amount of data, we rely on three distinct concepts: “fit-stretch,” the “triple 
embeddedness framework,” and the notion of “schemas and scripts.”  To be sure, these three conceptual 
approaches are among many that could have been utilized; Sovacool (2017) interviewed social theorists 
about which theories best “fit” the topic of electric mobility transitions and generated a list of 54 relevant 
to the topic.  Sovacool and Hess (2017) similarly interviewed theorists about conceptual frameworks 
seeking to explain sociotechnical change and generated a list of 96 theories. We selected these three in 
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particular because we wanted one to address patterns of transition (“fit-stretch”); one on incumbency 
(“triple embeddedness”); and one on discourse and innovation (“scripts”). This selection essentially 
means we draw from concepts analyzing a mix of sociotechnical change, industrial strategy, and 
rhetorical narratives.  Table 2 provides a high level contrast of these three theoretical lenses.    The 
remainder of this section of the paper introduces each in turn.  
Table 2: Overview of Sociotechnical Transitions, Triple Embeddedness, and Design Driven 
Innovation Conceptual Frameworks  
Name Discipline(s) Description  Emphasis  Key author(s)  
Multilevel 
Perspective 
(MLP) on 
Innovation 
Innovation 
studies and 
transitions 
management  
The development or 
introduction of new 
technologies leading to 
new socio-technical 
configurations depends on 
pathways involving niches, 
regimes, and landscapes 
Sociotechnical 
transitions  
Frank Geels, 
Johan Schot, 
Arie Rip, 
Frans 
Berkhout, 
René Kemp, 
Wim A. Smit, 
Rob Raven 
Triple 
Embeddedness 
Framework and 
the Dialectical 
Issue Life Cycle 
Model 
Innovation 
studies and 
transitions 
management 
Firms face selection 
pressures from the broader 
social, political, or 
economic environment.  
Firms can respond to these 
pressures in a variety of 
ways, from better 
managing their supply 
chains to changing 
marketing or operations 
practices to lobbying for 
political support.   
Incumbency  Frank Geels, 
CCR Penna 
Design Driven 
Innovation 
Management 
science, 
product 
development, 
organizational 
studies, and 
sociology 
Innovation can be 
envisioned as a social 
constructivist 
interpretation of product 
markets where needs or 
wants are not a priori or 
“given,” but instead result 
from a socially negotiated 
process between 
consumers and firms.  
Utilitarian, symbolic, and 
Visions, 
discourse, and 
narratives  
Roberto 
Verganti, P. 
DiMaggio, 
Andrew 
Hargadon, Y. 
Douglas 
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even emotional needs are 
therefore co-created. 
Source: Authors’ compilation modified from Sovacool and Hess 2017.  
 
2.1 Fitting and Stretching in Sociotechnical Transitions  
 The first concept we employ is that of “fit-stretch” from innovation studies, transition studies, 
and strategic niche management (Geels 2005a; Geels 2005b; Orsato et al 2012).  This literature has noted 
that during earlier transitions in mobility, such as from the horse drawn carriage to the modern 
automobile, technologies compete with each other for dominance across at least two dimensions: 
technical form and design, and user context and functionality.  These two dimensions can even be plotted 
visually on a graph, as Figure 1 illustrates.  New systems, such as the automobile, are adopted only when 
disruption to both dimensions—the technological and behavioral “discontinuity”—is not too great.   Put 
another way, new innovations must successfully harmonize a coevolution between technical form and 
social function, where they initially fit with existing regimes before gradually expanding into new 
technological forms or concrete user experiences.  Early builders of automobiles, for instance, saw 
themselves as promoting a device that “fit” (and even was designed to look like) a “horseless carriage” 
(Geels 2005a).   As the internal combustion engine was refined, however, automobiles began to diverge 
in their technical and stylistic attributes so that by the 1930s they looked nothing like carriages and had 
greatly expanded driver experiences. We see similar “fitting” and a focus on familiarity, rather than 
radicalism, beyond the domain of transport technologies as well: in the late nineteenth century, General 
Electric designed its first electric lights to look like gas-fired streetlights, it also manufactured early 
electric stoves to look like the earlier gas ranges and coal stoves (Sovacool and Hirsh 2009).  
Figure 1: The “Fit-Stretch” Concept 
 
 9 
 
Source: Modified from Geels 2005b  
 
Smith and Raven (2012) add that in order to succeed, new innovations or niches need to properly 
utilize a sort of “protective space” during a “nurturing stage” where they tap into processes such as 
learning, articulation of expectations, and the facilitation of networks that sustain their growth.  Very 
radical niche-innovations that deviate in many dimensions from existing socio-technical regimes often 
entail a “stretch-and-transform” pattern since their diffusion requires adjustments in wider contexts, 
which are likely to be more difficult, entailing various struggles.  Niche-innovations that are less radical 
may “fit” easier in existing contexts (and are thus easier and often preferred/supported by incumbent 
actors).  As Geels et al. (2016) write, new niche-innovations need to compete in an existing selection 
environment where incremental adjustments or conformity may produce more desirable results than 
radical change, discontinuity, and disruption.  
 
2.2 Embeddedness and the Dialectical Issue Life Cycle Model 
 Our second concept also draws from the innovation and transitions literature, but focuses on a 
different constituent element: incumbency.  In their “triple embeddedness framework” or “dialectical 
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issue life cycle model,” Penna and Geels (2012), Geels (2014), and Penna and Geels (2015) seek to 
synthesize insights from lifecycle theory (which conceptualize the dynamics of social problems) and 
innovation studies (to conceptualize the dynamics of technical solutions).  They created a framework that 
illustrates the constant conflict that occurs between problem-related pressures and responses from 
industry actors.  According to the framework, firms face selection pressures from the broader social, 
political, or economic environment.  Firms can respond to these pressures in a variety of ways, from 
better managing their supply chains to changing marketing or operations practices to lobbying for 
political support.   
Although the framework is fairly vast and complex, we draw particularly from one of its 
components: that of reluctance or resistance, where incumbent firms are reluctant to make substantial 
changes to address a problem or respond to selective pressure. They remain committed or “embedded” 
to their core strategy.  As the framework notes, firms are understandably reluctant to change under 
arching beliefs and mindsets, to revise corporate missions, and to develop new capabilities and technical 
knowledge.  Thus, they can use innovation strategies to defend the existing regime and develop 
incremental solutions.  In sum, and as Figure 2 illustrates, each industry sits at the nexus of an ecosystem, 
and this ecosystem has multiple pathways that influence it. However, it also means that ecosystem is 
slower to change since all of those pathways create inertia. Given this inertia, path dependence, or 
obduracy, firms may find it easier to confront a perceived radical innovation by deploying incremental 
technologies that stay within the bounds of the existing regime.   
Figure 2: Triple embeddedness framework of industrial regimes 
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Source: Geels 2014: 266 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) utilize the term “mimetic isomorphism” to explain how 
organizations (in this case, firms) can copy each other’s strategy or novelty in an attempt to pattern 
themselves on successful competitors. Mom (2004) refers to it as “mimicry” where incumbent actors try 
to imitate some properties of emerging and potentially challenging technologies, essentially “stealing” 
their potential.  Johnstone et al. (2017) note that incumbents can often attempt to retain their dominance 
by “recreating” or “reinventing” conventional systems as new and novel ones, discursively reframing 
older technologies in narratives similar to ones being articulated by the novel innovations they are 
competing with.   
 
2.3 Design-Driven Innovation and Scripts  
Our third and final concept derives from management theory, and it relates to the notion of 
schemas and scripts from design-driven innovation.   The basic idea of “design” has a long history, and 
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it is generally concerned with the subjective meanings that users come to ascribe to products. This 
etymology of design provoked Krippendorff (1989) to declare that at its core, “design is making sense 
(of things)”. All too often, however, interpretations of design remain closely linked to “product 
development” with occasionally a more intensive focus on users and “user-centered design” (Battistella 
et al. 2012).   Instead of being dictated by user requirements, “design-driven innovation” begins with the 
idea that it is a firm’s particular vision about a new product that serve as the primary conduit by which it 
can germinate new product meanings and languages that eventually achieve social diffusion.  As Verganti 
(2008) elaborates, design-driven innovation can be envisioned as a social constructivist interpretation of 
product markets where needs or wants are not a priori or “given,” but instead result from a socially 
negotiated process between consumers and firms.  Utilitarian, symbolic, and even emotional needs are 
therefore co-created, and design-driven innovation reflects a symbiotic dialogue with and stimulation of 
market demand for a new product.  Design-driven innovation employs a vision-dependent or firm-
centered view of innovation: user experiences are grounded and manifested through corporate strategy.  
Levitt and March (1988) refer to this as “target oriented” organizational learning.  
Put in other terms, design-driven innovation sits closer to the “technology push” school of thought 
on technological diffusion rather than the “market pull” school of thought. As Figure 3 depicts, when 
innovations are “market pulled,” they start from the analysis from user needs and only then subsequently 
search for technologies or discourses that can fulfill them.  User-centered innovation would sit here 
within the market-pull typology.  “Technology push” innovation, by contrast, emerges through the 
crucible of technological research and development, and it emphasizes that breakthrough technologies 
are often correlated with substantial or even radical alterations in product meanings.  The meaning 
attached to a technology may be more important than its functionality.  Verganti gives the example of 
the Swatch (watch) in the 1970s and 1980s, where the radical change was not in the manufacturing or 
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performance of the watch but in altering its meaning from an instrument of time or a piece of jewelry to 
a type of fashion accessory.   The shared area in the right hand side of Figure 3 is meant to depict where 
design-driven innovation sits within this typology. Design-driven innovation therefore envisions 
technology “as an enabler of new product meanings for the customer” (Dell’Era et al. 2010). 
Figure 3: Functionality and Meaning in Design-Driven Innovation  
 
Source: Modified from Verganti (2008) 
 Given its focus on semiotics and meaning, it may come as no surprise that one critical element of 
design-driven innovation is the discursive or performative dimension to niche innovations.  As Hargadon 
(2003) and Hargadon and Douglas (2001) have argued, purely novel ideas or radically innovative 
products or processes often fail to register because no established logics or heuristics exist to describe or 
comprehend them.  Instead, they go unnoticed and undervalued.  Without invoking new levels of 
understanding and meaning, innovations and inventions will likely never be understood let alone adopted 
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and diffused.   Success, Hargadon and Douglas (2001) intone, requires entrepreneurs to locate their ideas 
within one set of understanding or to invent or create another.   Ultimately these points reaffirm that 
design does not happen simply because of progress or intellectual discovery; instead, innovation occurs 
only through the concentrated efforts of collective designers and their intellectual or cultural worldview 
(Sheller 2014: 57). 
Here, the notion of schemas and scripts is most apt.  DiMaggio (1997: 269) writes that scripts are 
“knowledge structures that represent objects or events and provide default assumptions about their 
characteristics, relationships, and entailments under conditions of incomplete information” (DiMaggio, 
1997: 269).  Hargadon and Douglas (2001) propose that to interpret new situations and advance coping 
responses, actors must choose from a set of scripts to direct action and understanding in highly 
particularized contexts.  Barley and Tolbert (1997: 271) suggest that scripts fulfill a social logic of an 
“interaction order” where innovations can be read as “historical accretions of past practices and 
understandings that set conditions on action.”  Scripts enable us to better understand why various actors 
act, and they represent the means through which understanding and action are embedded in different 
environments.  Scripts can also constrain and exclude rather than empower, sort of like a film script that 
sets restrictions on what actors can or must do to adhere to the plot (Oudshoorn and Pinch 2003).   
When applied to “new” technologies such as electric vehicles, Gjoen and Hard (2002) add that 
scripts can fulfill varying roles from inscription of engineering designs into products, prescription of how 
adopters ought to use a technology, and subscription of a technology into a broader socio-material 
environment.  They also note that users often assign certain meanings to technologies without necessarily 
recognizing all the originally intended inscriptions.  In addition, Sovacool and Ramana (2015) argue that 
such scripts or “rhetorical visions” tend to have four interconnected attributes.  They are (1) functional 
by fulfilling some perceived social need, and by enabling proponents to capture resources, serving to 
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broker or anchor relationships between relevant social groups.  They are (2) utopian, advancing a 
technology for its purported ability to bring about a society viewed as perfect or at least considerably 
better than the present. They are (3) strategically contradictory, having an inherent degree of 
manufactured ambiguity so that they can be general enough to enroll actors but vague enough to 
withstand criticism.  They lastly retain (4) a degree of “rhetorical selectivity” or “selective remembrance” 
in that they choose what aspects history to highlight and leave out potential challenges to their vision as 
if they simply did not exist.   
3. The history and promise of Better Place (2007-2013) 
 Before demonstrating the explanatory power of the three theories above, it is useful to first 
provide a brief history of Better Place.  Better Place was founded by entrepreneur Shai Agassi in 2007 
with the aim of imagining a society that was no longer reliant on fossil fuels.  Essentially, Better Place 
planned on building the system for electric vehicles before selling the electric vehicles.  Based on the 
assumptions that the lack of a charging system was a main barrier to the adoption of electric vehicles, 
constructing this large system would have been a costly, but certainly logical foundation to base their 
business on.  Moreover, by amortizing the high capital cost of the electric vehicle to more manageable 
yearly payments, Better Place appeared to set itself up as a solution to electric vehicle implementation’s 
biggest problems.   
 More specifically, Agassi believed that EVs would only sell if they were functionally the same 
as traditional internal combustion engine vehicles.  They had to be the same price, or cheaper, but 
batteries made EV’s more expensive.  They had to “refuel” or “charge” in the same amount of time, but 
depending on the charger available (at that time) , fueling lasted between 2-8 hours.  They had to “feel” 
like a normal car, but extending driving range was untenable to mass production.  So what could Better 
Place do?  To make EVs more affordable, Better Place proposed to retain ownership of battery and 
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instead lease to customer – greatly reducing capital cost.  To make refueling more efficient, Better Place 
patented a battery swapping technology where by a vehicle could be “refueled” in about two minutes.  
And to ensure that EVs “felt” like a normal automobile, they partnered with a traditional automotive 
manufacturer, Nissan-Renault, and sold the Fluence Z.E.  
 According to the Better Place business model, a client would first sign up to a mobility package, 
which varied according to location (country and area). In broad terms, the mobility package defined the 
number of kilometers per month that the client was entitled to drive for a given payment. The idea was 
that this would be similar to signing up with a mobile phone operator whereby you buy a device but also 
purchase “hours” to use it; the equivalent here for Better Place was kilometers travelled per year.  The 
Fluence Z.E. was bought in parallel with the mobility package, enabling them to access Better Place’s 
network of charging and battery swapping stations.   Again, as in the mobile phone business, more 
expensive contracts entitle clients to higher discounts, even to the point where certain phones may even 
be given for free. Although pricing depended on location and electricity prices (among other factors), 
frequent drivers were expected to pay less upfront for an EV than they currently pay for a conventional 
car. Ultimately, as the model progressed and costs declined, Agassi hoped that the vehicle could even be 
given away for free, charging only for the kilometers driven (like the most competitive of the mobile 
phone plans). 
 Intuitively, their business model had potential.  To address range anxiety, the Fluence Z.E. had a 
stated range of 115 miles – but Better Place had charging network to supplement that.  To address a lack 
of public charging infrastructure, Better Place started building a network across their first two pilot 
countries, Denmark and Israel—in Denmark because it had aggressive climate and energy polices and 
supportive market research suggesting that at least 25% of drivers would be interested in Better Place 
EVs; in Israel because it operates as a sort of “energy island” that desperately wants to reduce dependence 
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on foreign supplies of oil (Orsato et al. 2009; Noel and Sovacool 2016).  To address long charging times, 
their battery swapping scheme did actually take less than 2 minutes.  And their battery leasing did reduce 
the capital costs of purchasing an EV (though it only did this by raising costs for BP, since BP had to 
invest in several batteries per vehicle).   
 Better Place was backed not only by a bold business plan; it was supported by some major 
investors and regulators.   The initial investment of $130 million into the company came from Israel 
Corporation, Israel's largest oil refinery, but this ballooned to roughly $850 million after General Electric, 
Morgan Stanley, HSBC and others got involved (Woody 2013).  This upped its total market valuation at 
one point at $2.25 billion.  In Israel, BP planned a large network of charging and swapping stations to 
cover the entire nation by 2012. This plan included 2.5 charging spots for every car on the road in Israel, 
starting with 500,000 chargers, in total costing between $50 and $100 million (Andersen et al. 2009).   
Israeli planners supported Better Place with vehicle tax breaks and public investments in charging 
stations.  To help Better Place, the Israeli government also subsidized the cost of purchasing EVs to make 
them equivalent to conventional vehicles and committed public tax dollars to build recharging and 
maintenance stations throughout Israel—it was (unrealistically) expected that one-third of drivers would 
be purchasing electric vehicles (Brown and Sovacool 2011).   In Denmark, DONG Energy also invested 
strongly in Better Place charging and battery swapping stations throughout Zealand, Fuhn, and Jutland, 
its three main islands.  
Indeed, during the height of Better Place’s popularity over this time, more than 100,000 people 
went on tours of Better Place’s Visitors Center in Israel—including not only grade-school students and 
tourists but also and dozens of U.S. congressmen, senators, and governors. Some 30,000 people sat down 
with a Better Place salesperson to pick a color and fill out a form stating their intent to purchase a car 
whose price had not yet been announced.  Better Place also had aggressive plans to expand beyond 
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Denmark and Israel to Australia, Canada, China, and California and Hawaii in the United States.  The 
company hired local executives (some were former politicians) and made partnerships with a wide array 
of players in those countries. Better Place was also endorsed publicly by Israeli Prime Minister Shimon 
Peres, former U.S. President Bill Clinton, and New York Times journalist Thomas Friedman, among 
others.  As one former employee told Chafkin (2014), “The technology worked, customers were satisfied 
… It would have been a revolution.” 
4. Insights for Sociotechnical Transitions  
 So why wasn’t Better Place successful?  After selling only 1,300 cars across Denmark and Israel, 
Better Place declared bankruptcy in 2013, and its assets were eventually sold off for a paltry $450,000.  
If the state of EV and battery technology at that time was not the sole source of failure, what was?   
In this section, drawing from social theory, we offer additional reasons for why Better Place struggled.  
Although its business plan was bold, it was not necessarily sound.  The business environment BP was 
competing in and should have been considered by a competent business development or executive team; 
grossly inaccurate understanding of capital expenditure and material costs also took their toll.  The 
concepts of “fit-stretch,” “embeddedness,” and “scripts” offer three helpful, and interconnected, frames 
by which to assess these impediments.  
4.1 From “Fitting-Stretching” to “Breaking” 
In some ways, Better Place was an obvious “fit” with the existing regime of automobility.  It 
attempted to make EVs more like “normal cars” and sought to eliminate range anxiety and create a 
temporal parity in terms of refueling time.  Dealers and salespersons of the Fluence Z.E even quipped 
that it looked like “a slightly fatter Honda Civic” (see Figure 4) and that the only thing missing compared 
to a conventional car, on the “outside” at least, was the lack of a cup holder where instead a center 
computer console was placed.  It was only under the hood, on the “inside,” where the car differed: a 
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normal 1.6 liter internal combustion engine was replaced with a slightly smaller 70 kW electric motor, 
and a tank for petrol was replaced by a slightly larger 22 kWh lithium ion-battery pack. 
Figure 4: A Better Place Fluence Z.E. at the Düsseldorf Autoshow, Germany, February 2012 
 
However, a closer examination reveals that Better Place, in fact, represented much more of a 
“stretch” than a “fit.”  First, unlike traditional business models, ownership of the vehicle was separated 
from that of the battery and, eventually, the vehicle was to become “free” with drivers paying only 
variated surcharges for mobility (kilometers driven).   In other terms, the explicit intention to “fit” BP 
vehicles into the existing regime of automobility (recharging in minutes, limited range anxiety, feels like 
a normal car) directly conflicted with both the BP company visions and business plans, which sought to 
“stretch” beyond social norms as quickly as possible (free cars with high monthly payments as a business 
model, rapid expansion to other countries). In Israel, BP faced strong political opposition for representing 
- mainly via the Agassi family - a specific political faction. There was also the worry of clients to be 
under a monopoly of a startup and the opposition from other leasing companies. Overall, Better Place 
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“fit” along the technical aspects of the vehicle, but “stretched” too quickly in other dimensions of their 
vision. 
Second, Agassi was such a charismatic entrepreneur that he intentionally sought to innovate 
processes he didn’t necessarily have to.  One relatively infamous example relates to later abandoned 
plans for using a “robotic arm” to swap batteries rather than simply having humans do it.  Agassi wanted 
desperately to “think differently,” and he brainstormed an idea where they could build a robotic system 
to uninstall and reinstall batteries for what he guessed was $250. In reality, wall mounted charger and 
cables alone for such a contraption cost $700 and “thousands more” would have been needed for the 
automated robotic systems, similar to those used in the military for deploying nuclear weapons.  
Thus, although Better Place “fit” with a degree of user preferences and mobility patterns, the 
company’s vision ultimately challenged or “stretched” them on fundamental grounds (cars for free, paid 
for via subscription services like mobile phones, battery swapping too quick) and technical grounds 
(unnecessarily sophisticated equipment at the planning and design stage, which they had to abandon).   
Indeed, we explore more on this point in the next section which discusses how some automotive 
companies viewed Better Place as a threat and they pursued innovations to undermine it.   Therefore, if 
plotted in Figure 5, Better Place occupies a sort of no-person’s land that “stretches” too far in both 
dimensions of user context and technical form.  Put another way, Better Place’s actions amounted to a 
fit-stretch strategy where neither enhancements to form or function created a true “fit”.   
 
 
Figure 5: The “Fit-Stretch” Concept Applied to Electric Vehicles  
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Source: Modified from Dijk et al. 2013. Note: BEV = Battery Electric Vehicle. BEV with battery 
swapping = Better Place. PHEV = Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicle. HEV = Hybrid Electric Vehicle. FCV 
= Fuel Cell Vehicle.  
 
4.2 From “Embeddedness” to “Disruptive Innovation amidst Diversification”  
 We posit that Better Place also faced difficulties because of the existing automotive regime. It 
became susceptible to strategic competitive responses from embedded incumbent actors.  Although 
Better Place did its best to frame itself as selling a car equivalent in price and performance (or perhaps 
even better than its conventional counterparts), it can in fact be interpreted as a much more radical attempt 
to revolutionize the industry.  As Orsato et al. (2009) have noted, under the logic of Better Place, cars 
themselves are “incomplete products.”  Agassi himself used this sort of rhetoric when trying to sell the 
Better Place model to investors.  As he wrote in his 2007 White Paper: 
Cars are not complete products, as they would not provide any function without fuel and 
variety of services (such as maintenance). … Contrast that with the electric vehicle where 
the container for energy, in this case a battery, costs roughly 7,000 Euros, yet the 
electricity to run the car costs 2,000 Euros for the entire life of the car … At some point 
during the next ten years, the total cost of electric energy (with battery) for a car will 
equate the cost of fuel for a single year. We predict that at some point in time before that 
next cross-under point the entire car industry will tip to electric drive as the main design 
principle for new cars. 
 
Such sentiments were confirmed in our interviews as well, with one noting that: 
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Better Place tried to reinvent mobility and the car itself; it was not an incremental effort, but a 
transformative attempt to change our notion of what driving and moving are. 
 
Interview respondents noted that conventional cars rely on complementary services and products ranging 
from roads, bridges, and highways to fuel providers and maintenance shops to function.  Moreover, the 
most expensive aspect of ownership, fuel, occurs during its usage rather than its specific point of 
purchase.  Thus, successful commercialization of Better Place’s vehicles require consumers to transform 
their financial conceptualization of what a car is and does.  They need to comprehend exactly how much 
they drive per month as well as the total cost of running a car, and be able to properly asses and discount 
fuel savings against capital costs over time.   Agassi suggested repeatedly that “new design principles” 
were needed for cars and that Better Place challenged traditional concepts of both design and 
manufacturing. 
 Unfortunately, the conventional ideas about what a car “is” and “does” did not exist in isolation, 
and became embedded in automotive manufacturing capabilities and corporate strategy.  As Kirsch et al. 
(2009) argue, ever since the introduction of Henry Ford’s “Model T” in 1908, most of the players in the 
automotive industry have rigorously adhered to a product based business model.  Integrated original 
equipment manufacturers—perched atop complex and distributed global supply chains—design, build, 
assemble, advertise, and disseminate vehicles to franchised dealers who then sell it to the customer, 
whom takes ownership and responsibility for the final product, and subsumes the risk or expense of all 
operating and maintenance tasks.  This business model is anchored in the vehicle viewed as a product 
the consumer buys for a fairly high fixed cost, and profits accrue to the automobile manufacturer and 
dealership accrue mostly at the point of sale (and later, in occasional situations, for maintenance).  
Whenever major incumbent firms within the automotive industry such as General Motors, Toyota, or 
Volkswagen, or even newer entrants such as Tesla, innovate and release new products, they tend not to 
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deviate from this model. A Toyota Prius or a Tesla Roadster are still sold in a lump sum similar to the 
conventional cars they are replacing; the release of these new vehicles still follows a strategy that focuses 
predominantly on fuel efficiency and emission compliance while maintaining the basic, product-based 
business model. 
 Better Place, by contrast, challenged the entirety of this model.  One interview respondent argued 
that: 
The idea was pretty radical, from the start, which is why there was so much hope and 
hype around it.  It was creative, it was thrilling, it was imaginative.   
 
Although Better Place’s products did in a sense fit into one ecosystem, that of user functionality (trying 
to make the car like any other, its difference being a matter only “inside” the car’s engine and fuel 
tank/battery), they unknowingly perhaps did not fit into another one even more important, that of 
automotive manufacturing and franchising.  As one Better Place manager put it: 
Shai correctly wanted to create a situation where the automakers would move quickly to 
electric.  The carmakers are used to a totally different ecosystem. Somebody from another 
industry trying to treat them as an equal partner is not in their DNA. 
 
In this way, BP vehicles somewhat radically and completely challenged conventional norms of 
automotive design and manufacturing.  They required a different body, made of different frames and 
composites to handle lighter weight. They required different engines, with advanced motors, power 
controllers, batteries, and regenerative braking systems. They required different transmission controls, 
chasses, adapted steering and brakes, as well as a different refueling and electronic charging system. An 
internal combustion engine will run for about 5,000 hours before needing serviced, but an electric motor 
can function for roughly 100,000 hours, meaning it needs much less maintenance (Dyerson and 
Pilkington 2005). In short, as Orsato and Wells (2007) state, EVs require competences that incumbents 
are not able to supply without major investments and time. 
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Better Place advocates attempted to frame these weaknesses as strengths, and talked about the 
vitality of BP’s business model for “massively disrupting” the ways that automobiles were made, and 
challenging conventional practices. Agassi’s 2007 White Paper framed this not so discretely in terms of 
winners as losers.  In it, Agassi estimated that the “entire picture” of “markets affected” by Better Place 
exceeded some $6 trillion per year.  As he wrote: 
The total economic dislocation seems almost incomprehensible.  Fuel at the pump 
represents a market of $1.5 trillion every year.  Cars and components size roughly to the 
same size of market, $1.5 trillion a year. Financing for new cars, gaining acceptance 
worldwide is estimated at $0.5 trillion a year.  Clean electricity generation for cars is a 
market that will reach $0.15 trillion a year.  ERG infrastructure construction will reach 
levels of $0.5 trillion a year.  Battery manufacturing will reach similar levels of $0.5 
trillion a year, accounting for reduction in battery cost as the market size will continue to 
increase. In-car services, such as GPS, media, phone as well as related services such as 
insurance and maintenance collectively worth more than $1.5 trillion a year will be 
affected.  Carbon credits alone will be worth roughly $0.3 trillion when all cars are driven 
on clean electricity.  In the aggregate, we are looking at an annual dislocation reaching 
roughly $6 trillion a year. 
 
One former BP manager astutely told us that: 
Better Place took it as a badge of honour to put trillions of dollars fossil fuel and 
automotive assets under siege, but never seemed to realize that such disruption came with 
incredible risks. 
 
In sum: BP actively encouraged its image as a threat to incumbent actors.  
 
However, BP did more than merely attempt to frame itself as disruptive innovation – it actively 
avoided working with incumbents, even those that could have helped it.  As one specific example, Better 
Place originally envisioned a partnership with General Motors and Chevrolet.  Rather than change his 
design, Agassi refused—and General Motors proceeded to develop its own charging stations.   It also 
meant that Better Place, at that time lacking a partnership with a manufacturer in the United States, was 
not eligible for funds as part of the $50 billion bailout of GM in 2009. The U.S. Department of Energy 
offered loan guarantees to several clean technology startups, including Tesla Motors, but refused to give 
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Better Place any of the earmarked funds on grounds of ineligibility. One Better Place manager would 
later refer to this as a counterproductive “disrupt those closest to you” strategy. 
 According to our interview data, although we could not verify it with public information, major 
incumbent actors such as Chevrolet and GM were not the only ones to defensively innovate – Tesla also 
incorporated Better Place ideas into its products.  Tesla’s primary mission is to develop and 
commercialize EVs first in the premium sports car market before moving into more mainstream vehicles 
such as sedans and non-luxury models (Sovacool et al. 2017), but their approach is less disruptive than 
Better Place’s.  Tesla’s corporate strategy is more comparable to the computer and consumer electronics 
industry than it is to the rest of the automobile industry.  This is clearly evident through their EV 
development roadmap, where they first launched their premium-priced-niche model Tesla Roadster, 
when production costs were still very high. Subsequently, the Model S was introduced, a high-end family 
sedan, with prices starting at approximately half those of the Roadster. Future models are expected to 
increase in volume and decrease to half the price of Model S. 
 Tesla, similar to GM, pursued a two pronged approach to “containing” (in the words of one 
interviewee) BP:  battery swapping and charging infrastructure.  As one of our participants stated: 
After closely monitoring BP during its early years, Tesla made an internal decision to proceed 
with the consideration of battery swapping in 2012.  They designed and piloted the technology in 
secret before showcasing it in 2013 at a facility at Harris Ranch in Coalinga, California.  It is 
ironic that they launched their battery swapping the same year BP began to fall apart.  Tesla 
attempted to mimic and mirror BP’s strategy: the goal was to swap batteries in 90 seconds or 
less, with an initial market of drivers in California wanting to drive their Model Ss from Los 
Angeles to San Francisco. Tesla even borrowed terminology from BP’s advertisements, noting in 
their promotional material that “it’s possible to replace a Model S Battery in less time than it 
takes to fill up a gasoline tank.” 
 
As a bonus, the battery swapping approach also enabled Tesla to qualify for Zero Emission Vehicle 
Credits (ZEV Credits) under California law (Team 2014).  In tandem with battery swapping, or perhaps 
as a fallback in case it did not work, Tesla invested heavily in a “Supercharger network” of 312 stations 
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for charging and more than 1,700 actual chargers deployed worldwide (with most concentrated in 
California).  Advertisement’s for Tesla noted that such chargers enable drivers to charge at “400 miles 
per hour.” 
 Tesla was not the only firm to “borrow” from BP’s business strategy.  The national electricity 
supplier in France EDF and the automobile manufacturer Toyota also announced the piloting of 
recharging networks and battery swapping stations across France and the United Kingdom in 2014, after 
BP declared bankruptcy.  Together, these new entrants and related businesses started a mutually 
reinforcing process that could eventually characterize the “regime amidst diversification” proposed by 
Dijk, Orsato and Kemp (2015). In such scenario, the dominant regime of automobility starts embracing 
socio-technical diversification via the emergence and diffusion of new market niches, which coexist with 
the dominant regime – in this case, of internal combustion engine cars. Within this perspective, if Better 
Place would only have survived for a few years longer, its chances of succeeding in the long run would 
also have increased, as competitors such as Tesla and industry incumbents would slowly reinforce the 
emerging regime – of the new EV ecosystem (swapping stations, fast-charging, etc.). A telling lesson 
here may be that a single actor or niche does not have sufficient power (the ability to influence) to 
transform the whole automotive regime. 
 
4.3 From “Design-Driven Innovation” to “Inflated Scripts” and “Erasure”  
 BP fits the classification of “design-driven innovation” almost perfectly, given that it zealously 
pursued a particular corporate vision. Rather than beginning with a focus on better understanding drivers 
and users or improving manufacturing, the classic story of BP’s germination (told to us repeatedly, and 
confirmed in other articles relying on interviews with BP staff, such as Chafkin 2014) goes something 
like this.  Shai Agassi, a self-named “serial entrepreneur” and “rising star” within the software industry, 
thought up the Better Place concept in Davos, Switzerland, at a Global Economic Forum meeting on a 
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sunny afternoon in 2005. He started with a visionary question: “How would you run a country without 
oil?”  Before leaving SAP, where he worked, hiring a single employ, or even taking a single meeting 
with a partner or raising capital, Agassi went public with his idea, presenting it in 2006 at the Brookings 
Institute in Washington, DC, where heavyweights such as Bill Clinton and Shimon Peres were present. 
They were so effusive and supportive of Agassi’s ideas, the narrative continues, that he immediately quit 
his job and started BP.  He then wrote a fairly extensive White Paper in 2007 entitled “Projecting the 
Future of Energy, Transportation, and the Environment.”a  In press releases and public interviews 
connected with releasing the White Paper, Agassi intoned that he would sell millions of electric vehicles 
around the world, that he would create the world’s “first trillion dollar company” and “a new Industrial 
Revolution,” and that transitioning to electric cars was a moral imperative as well, similar to the 
“abolition of slavery.”  
 Better Place’s approach to innovation was therefore inseparable from this broader rhetorical 
vision.  In one of his memos collected through our data gathering process, Agassi stated that he felt:  
Anonymous, sitting next to giants. I could see myself in my imagination’s eye on that stage 
telling the story of Better Place, before I knew how there was a story, a company, or how 
it will be called. The vision permeated everything.  
 
Because BP began with and remained centered on this vision of national economies independent from 
oil, they explored almost every technological option and configuration. As one employee recounted: 
We looked at things that would make you laugh. Air cars, slot cars on electric rails, self-
driving robots, everything. 
And, as Chazkin (2014) adds: 
People were motivated by the vision: It was green, it was sustainable, and it was a little 
bit Zionist. It was a -beautiful dream to dream; people got hooked. It was only later that 
you'd see the redundancy, the arrogance. 
 
                                                 
a As our data collection process involved dozens of Better Place company documents and memos to file, we actually worked 
with three separate versions of the White Paper: a preliminary draft, a public version for public consumption, and a revised 
version circulated internally.   
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Agassi also compared his idea for electric mobility—giving the vehicle to consumers at a discounted cost 
and then charging them a monthly subscription—to Thomas Edison’s lightbulb, James Watt’s steam 
engine, Henry Ford’s Model T, and the Apollo space program from the United States.  
Another noteworthy aspect to the schemas and scripts surrounding BP relate to their positioning 
of Agassi and the company as radical and innovative. In this way, BP promoters succumbed to a process 
of “selective remembrance” (Sovacool and Ramana 2015) where they ignored or forgot historical data 
suggesting that BP was neither novel nor the first to propose battery swapping.  For instance, the Electric 
Vehicle Company in the United States operated a Battery Exchange Station on Broadway in New York 
City for a fleet of electric taxis in 1900 which ran until 1912, and the battery swapping itself occurred in 
three to four minutes via a hydraulic stabilizer (Kirsch 2000).   The Hartford Battery System Service in 
Connecticut also sold glider trucks without batteries and then charged a service fee to drivers per 
kilometers driven throughout the 1910s and 1920s, operating until the end of World War I when cheap 
diesel trucks and jeeps from the War flooded the United States market (Kirsch 2000).  In this way, neither 
BP’s idea for battery swapping nor charging customers a fee for battery use or mobility were new. Yet 
when Agassi was apparently told about this history, one of our respondent said “he didn’t want to hear 
that he hadn’t invented it.” 
The scripts and schemas surrounding BP became so broad and all encompassing, however, that 
they ended up missing a number of important details.  What is also interesting here is not necessarily 
what was included, but what was excluded or erased.  Most critically, the scripts repeatedly 
misrepresented actual vehicle ownership and operating costs to users.  Agassi repeatedly said in meetings 
and speeches his car would be cheaper than conventional ones or even free; yet the first Renault Fluence 
ZE cost about $30,000 and on top of that, customers did not own the battery, and had to pay an extra 
$200 to $500 a month as a “subscription” to use BP’s charging and swapping network. In Denmark, due 
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to higher transportation costs and income taxes for dealerships, a BP car cost close to $40,000 (excluding 
the cost of the battery). In an early meeting with investors in 2008, Agassi told reports that Better Place’s 
cars would be priced “half that of the equivalent gasoline model today” even though Better Place had yet 
to agree with Renault on a price. This is an exemplary example of placing the vision of BP before facts.  
This act of discounting costs later came to be jokingly and repeatedly referred to by colleagues of Agassi 
as “Shai math.”   
The visionary and optimistic scripts circulating BP also influenced hiring decisions – those 
expressing criticism or skepticism, even a moderate amount, were “told they were not the right fit for 
BP” or in some cases “removed by forceful security guards in the middle of interviews.”  As one of our 
respondents reaffirmed: 
The numbers never, never really made sense, they didn’t add up. Any competent business person, 
or investor, would have known this, but the company had surrounded themselves only with ‘yes 
men’ to the point where they became delusional.  
 
This meant that BP ended up hiring an initial staff who shared Agassi’s vision, but lacked any experience 
whatsoever with automobile manufacturing, management, and infrastructure.  As one BP manager stated 
in 2009: 
 We had not a single automotive expert, nobody who had built or designed a car in their career.   
Agassi hired his little brother Tal Agassi to manage the battery swapping stations components of  
BP, despite the fact that he had experience only in accounting. 
The vision-oriented scripts of Better Place, coupled with a selection bias in the hiring of its staff, 
meant that BP excelled in terms of focusing on the “big picture,” but in doing so they missed what one 
respondent called “the small, vital details necessary to run a successful business.”  The company lacked 
caution and also seemed to “miss” important areas where they should have cut costs, modified strategy, 
focused on maximizing profits and minimizing losses.  One example here was spending $5 million on 
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the construction of a visitors’ center inside a large oil-storage tank that had been converted into a 
showroom and featured a 3 kilometer-long track where interested customers could test-drive a car, a 
movie theater with 30 vintage cars seats, and even a holographic machine which projected a life-size 
image of Agassi himself.    
These and other costs quickly added up: before BP ever sold its first car in January of 2012, the 
company was losing money on operating expenses, research, salaries, and payments to suppliers at a rate 
of about $500,000 per day.  A fascination with the BP vision also meant that BP managers didn’t pay 
close enough attention to their contracts with suppliers which created more than $100 million in liabilities 
that started to accrue as delays and technical difficulties occurred.  BP lost $80 million with troubles over  
billing system software with the firm Amdocs.  BP later became bankrupt, saw its assets liquidated and 
its patents being transferred to other firms.  As Chafkin (2014) noted when he spoke to one of the early 
adopters who purchased a Fluence Z.E., “We didn't know how bad the state of the company was when 
we bought the car—we just really believed in the vision.” 
Thus, Agassi and his promoters blinded themselves to the real potential pitfalls surrounding their 
business model. As one respondent noted: 
There was a fundamental flaw to BP’s business model that only became apparent over 
time: people don’t want to buy a car the same way they buy a phone.  Hardly anybody 
likes their wireless phone carrier, instead, they love their iPhone or Samsung Galaxy.  
They love and identify with their car, not the mobility it offers. Conspicuous consumption 
needs rooted in a product, not a practice.  
 
Yet, as another BP employee lamented: 
The tragedy of the company is that we were trying to accelerate the trend toward 
electrification and we may have retarded it. 
 Thus, returning to theory, BP decision-makers came to suffer from varying degrees of what 
Veblen came to call “trained incapacity” and Burke (1984: p. 7) “occupational psychosis,” related terms 
that describe how people prepare to see the world in certain ways, while simultaneously developing a 
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bias that blinds them to other perspectives.  Hargadon and Douglas (2001) note that although successful 
innovations must evoke strong emotions from early adopters, “Entrepreneurs must 
initially present the meaning and value of their innovations, including their novel features in the language 
of existing institutions by giving them the appearance of familiar ideas.”   The schemas and scripts 
circulating BP did the opposite: they framed the technology as fantastically disruptive, unfamiliar, and 
revolutionary.  
5. Conclusion and implications  
 The traditional reasons given in the literature for the failure of Better Place point to a mosaic of 
inferior technology, mismanagement, overstretch and waste, and poor business strategy. Although these 
elements certainly had a negative impact on BP – and we highlighted many salient ones - three other 
factors also played essential roles.  BP stretched too far beyond existing niches so the point where it was 
incompatibility with both user expectations (high upfront prices for the vehicle and high monthly service 
costs for battery swapping and reaching) and functionality (design requirements extending well beyond 
what major manufacturers were capable of).  According to our original data, BP took an antagonistic 
approach towards collaboration with incumbent actors such as General Motors and Toyota and new 
entrants such as Tesla, and thus left themselves open to defensive innovations on the part of those firms 
in two of BP’s core areas, battery swapping and charging stations. It amounted to a “disrupt those closest 
to you” strategy that was self-defeating. Moreover, the compelling and at times captivating scripts and 
schemas deployed by BP sponsors downplayed risks and inflated expectations to the point where 
empirical difficulties with vehicle and battery pricing, hiring, supply chain management, software, 
billing/accounting, and contracts were downplayed or, worse, ignored.  In outlining this more complete 
explanation, we offer at least three conclusions for those interested in innovation management, 
transitions, and design-driven innovation.  
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First, new innovative niches have limits to how far they can stretch.  BP did not present itself as 
an initial “fit” with existing user practices, discourses, and technical form and thus deviated from existing 
regimes in ways that made it too demanding for users and manufactures to adopt (too much “stretch”).  
It was a “stretch” with regard to the car regime (especially core elements such as manufacturing and 
franchising), despite efforts to make it look more like “fit” by making reference to a model that was 
common in mobile telephony. Such “stretching” was made even more visible by the inherent tension in 
BP predicating their business model on selling cars as similar to an internal combustion vehicle but 
having a prominent spokesperson for the company (Agassi) viewing himself and his company as one of 
the most revolutionary figures in history. Agassi thought of his ideas as a “fit” (i.e., battery swapping), 
but focused almost exclusively on his visionary “stretch” (i.e. becoming the next Henry Ford, 
transforming society beyond oil). 
Second, innovations do not occur in a vacuum, and incumbent actors rarely, if ever, remain static.  
Incumbents including General Motors and Toyota, and new entrants such as Tesla, pursued a dynamic 
approach to “containing” BP. They took advantage of opportunities and reoriented themselves towards 
new technology such as swappable batteries and charging infrastructure, leading to a marginalization and 
eventual defensive disruption of BP’s mission and strategy. What was clearly missing from Better Place’s 
vision was the functional use of chargers, which is what Tesla, GM, and Nissan have since focused on, 
as well as fitting into broader user (and financer) conceptions of the automobility regime.  Compare BP’s 
overinvestment in swapping stations with Tesla’s expansion of their Supercharger network.  One 
explanation for this overinvestment could be that Agassi explicitly removed potential employees that 
could have helped BP recognize the business value of chargers.  Battery swapping may have been 
preferred by a marginal number of drivers, but by refusing to compromise or expand their vision, or work 
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with other actors in the automotive industry, Better Place in a way “contained” themselves.  Said another 
way, BP exclusively focused on their vision while ignoring any and all facts contrary to it. 
Third, innovators may try to make their radical innovation look more incremental in   
discursive terms—they employ scripts and schemas that present the technology as familiar and non-
disruptive. BP, however, did the opposite, and promulgated a vision about freeing national economies 
from petroleum-based transport. In doing so, they did meet the criteria of functionality and utopianism 
inherent in similar rhetorical visions about future energy systems.  BP’s vision was functional in that it 
fulfilled multiple social needs related to lessening oil dependence, diversifying away from fossil fuels, 
and promoting low-carbon transport, and they were utopian for arguing that BP could radically transform 
the entire automotive industry and disrupt roughly $6 trillion in global annual assets.    
However, BP’s vision suffered from two drawbacks inherent in these types of rhetorical 
strategies: their vision was strategically contradictory, at times talking about the viability of business 
models and returns on investment and at times talking about how cars could be given away “for free;” 
and they were “rhetorically selective” in ignoring the century-old history of earlier efforts to 
commercialize both battery swapping and fee-for-service electric truck driving in the United States at the 
turn of the last century. Moreover, the schemas and scripts deployed by BP inflated expectations about 
the real costs of EV ownership and operation and at times ignored other core elements of business 
strategy, falling victim to “Shai math.” The tendency for BP to hire top-level managers based on their 
adherence to the vision rather than competence in automotive manufacturing meant the group insulated 
itself from criticism and feedback that may have corrected such difficulties at earlier stages of research 
and demonstration. BP thus offers a stark warning about the drawbacks inherent with overconfidence, 
hubris and radicalism, attributes that made BP’s vision alluring and attractive at the same time they sowed 
the very seeds of the company’s downfall.   
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